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The Notion of Solidarity and the Secret
History of American Labor Law
THOMAS C. KOHLERt
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I. INTRODUCTION

What comes to mind when you hear the word,
solidarity? A strike or a union organizing effort perhaps?
The faded rhetoric of some by-gone people's democratic
regime? European social policy? The remarkable Polish
social movement of the 1980s whose appearance helped to
bring down the Soviet bloc? Something the Pope wrote? The
protean character of the notion of solidarity and the
astonishing extent of its influence reveal themselves in the
the word
evokes.
associations
rich and diverse
Nevertheless, for most of us, the term has a distinctly
foreign if not a vaguely mysterious ring about it. As Nathan
Glazer recently observed, "Fraternity or solidarity are not
and it would be
familiar terms for us [Americans],
'2
interesting to explore why."
This paper attempts to respond to at least part of
Glazer's challenge. There is an important but little-known
story behind the notion of solidarity, and it is high time
that it be brought to the surface and critically examined.
Despite the alien sound of the word, the story of solidarity
is not primarily about movements, ideas, and events that
took place in the hazy past or in strange and distant places.
The story is about us and about how an idea that migrated
with waves of Jewish and Catholic immigrants came to play
an immensely powerful role in shaping some of our central
social and legal institutions.
At the heart of this story lie two competing visions of
liberty, and ultimately, two competing accounts of what it

2. Nathan Glazer, Foreword to PIERRE ROSANVALLON, THE NEW SOCIAL
RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE, at ix (Barbara Harshaw trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 2000).
QUESTION:
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means to be a human being. The dominant account-the
one most of us use to explain the significance of our lives to
ourselves-instrumentalizes our social ties and portrays us
as sovereign, self-defining, auto-teleological selves. The
alternative to this strongly individualistic and atomistic
account is one that emphasizes our embeddedness in and
dependence upon social and cultural ties. In the latter
perspective, community mediates our understandings of
ourselves and the world, and sets (or undermines) the
conditions for authentic self-rule. Here, community has a
normative function and represents the achievement of
shared understandings, meanings, and values. In contrast
to the dominant account that understands liberty in terms
of an "unencumbered self," the latter perspective sees
personal liberty and self-sufficiency as states realized only
through our ties with others. These bonds set the conditions
for our freedom. Liberty does not represent an individual
accomplishment, but a state of being only cooperatively
achieved and maintained.
The notion of solidarity traces the fault lines that run
through the foundations of our society and of modernity
itself. As we shall see, solidarity represents a reaction to
the sort of extreme and doctrinaire individualism that
characterizes so much of Enlightenment political thought
and the law it called forth. The word first appears in the
late 1700s, in the wake of the French Revolution, and its
use spread with the disruptions that accompanied the
political, economic, and social "triple revolution" that
transformed the patterns of life across the Western world
during the nineteenth century.
The emergence of the term and its subsequent
development reflect the efforts of a dizzyingly diverse array
of theorists, politicians, religious thinkers, and social
activists to respond to what early had become known as the
"social question." Its appearance betrays a deeply-felt
exigency, a recognition that a new way to conceive of social
bonds had to be struggled toward in the unprecedented
circumstances that people now confronted.
In its fullest significance, the social question raises the
most fundamental issues about human nature and the
frameworks and possibilities for pursuing life in common. It
sweeps matters concerning political, economic, and legal
arrangements, the character of the family, work, and other
social relationships, the role of the state, the place of civil
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society, etc., within its scope. The contests over these issues
characterize some of the most poignant struggles of the
nineteenth century, and the debates around them have
involved thinkers as diverse as Karl Marx, John Stuart
Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville, Herbert Spencer, Max Weber,
and the holders of the Chair of Peter, to name but a few.
Far from resolved, the disputes over the social question
continue unabated into the present, and if anything they
have become more pressing. We may now live in one world,
but how we should understand the character of our oneness
in this world-where our contacts to one another edge evercloser-remains tragically and dangerously unclear.
Solidarity sometimes seems to have as many meanings
as it has users. To Europeans at least, solidarity not only
constitutes one of the "indivisible, universal values" 3 on
which the European Union is founded, but also represents a
body of substantive rights that the constitution will
guarantee. 4 Solidarity also constitutes one of the core
values of the labor movement, both in the United States
and elsewhere. The term evokes the attitudes of unity,
fraternal concern, and the "one for all and all for one" spirit
of bondedness that form the foundation for any flourishing
association or stable society. In many respects, solidarity
serves as the contemporary replacement for the specifically
civic form of friendship that the pre-moderns regarded as a
requisite for any sort of political community because it sets
5
the stage for personal excellence and willing co-operation.
The present paper is a work-in-progress, and part of a
larger project investigating the impact of the notion of
solidarity on American and European law, in light of some
of the concerns mentioned above. To some degree, at least,
3. Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004 O.J.
(C310)41 ("The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union.").
4. Title IV of Part II sets forth, at a fairly high level of abstraction, the
rights solidarity encompasses. See id.
87-98, at 47-49. Proclaiming solidarity
a constitutionally guaranteed right is one thing. Determining in what solidarity
might actually consist is another. On this theme, see the thoughtful essay by a
former member of the German Constitutional Court, Ernst-Wolfgang
Bockenforde, Grundlagen europdischer Solidaritdt, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, June 20, 2003, at 8.
5. The seminal formulation of this point can be found in Book 7 of Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics and it would remain a core theme of political thought until
the time of Machiavelli and Hobbes.
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unions and labor law are familiar institutions to Americans.
Consequently, they provide a good place to begin a
discussion of the meaning and impact of the notion of
solidarity.
II. THE CURIOUS CHARACTER OF AMERICAN LABOR LAw

There is something undeniably strange about the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).6 A primary goal of
the Act is to establish a legal structure through which
employees can gain a voice in managerial decision making.
The scheme of employee participation that the Act
establishes, however, runs contrary to nearly all of our
expectations. In a legal system largely obsessed with the
protection and promotion of individual choice, the Act
paradoxically and consistently restricts it. A cornerstone of
the statutory scheme, the Act's exclusivity principle makes
the union chosen by the greater share of employees the
exclusive representative of them all. 7 Majority rule
displaces personal preference in all matters concerning
wages and working conditions. Once the majority has
designated a bargaining representative, the statute strictly
forbids any form of individual or minority dealing. This is
not law for the Marlboro Man or for the lone pioneer
striking out on his or her own. Here, the group enjoys
priority.
Few would associate rigidity with American society or
with its institutions. A willingness to experiment and an
eagerness to try new things goes hand-in-hand with the sort
of individualism that characterizes American life. Once
again, however, the Act confounds our reasonable
anticipations. Out of the many possible means for affording
employees a voice in workplace decision-making, the NLRA
sanctions only one: collective bargaining. It accomplishes
this through the statutory requirement that any body
through which employees participate in managerial
decision making be structurally independent of the

6. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
7. See 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (2000). For explication, see Emporium Capwell Co.
v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
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employer.8 This represents a carefully considered if highly
controversial choice that lies at the very core of the NLRA.
Regardless of employee sentiment, the Act broadly
forecloses the use of participative schemes not anchored by
and approved through a union. Consequently, in the
absence of a collective bargaining representative, an
employer's use of employee participative devices such as
quality circles, semi-autonomous work teams, and even
safety committees is almost always unlawful or arguably
so. 9

The labor law regime of no other legal system operates
in this fashion. In German and Japanese law, for example,
unions represent and have the authority to bargain only on
behalf of their own members. The terms of the agreements
that their unions make apply only to those employees who
have accepted membership. Moreover, both systems permit
individuals to bargain more favorable terms for themselves
than those provided in the collective bargaining agreement.
Such arrangements are widespread in Germany. Likewise,
in both nations, plural unionism in the workplace is
possible, and particularly in Japan, not uncommon. A
mandatory system of representation such as ours would
violate an individual's associational freedoms under the
German Constitution,' 0 a problem that our Supreme Court,
when directly confronted with the issue, nervously but
scrupulously avoided.' Nevertheless, despite their many
and striking differences, placing the American and German
schemes of employee representation into comparative
perspective reveals some surprising and almost entirely
overlooked connections between the two.
The NLRA appears to present an unusual case of
American exceptionalism. Not only does the Act have
unique characteristics that sharply distinguish it from the
labor relations law schemes of other nations, but its terms
do not fit well within the American legal pattern either. It
represents the only place in our highly-individualistically
oriented legal system where the law seeks to protect and
8. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(2); see NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock
Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
9. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
10. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 9, abs.3; id. at art. 12.
11. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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enhance the status of the individual through the formation
and maintenance of freely-formed and autonomous
associations. From nearly any vantage point one chooses to
consider it, the NLRA represents something of an
eccentricity. It is the legal version of odd man out.
How can this be? What accounts for the peculiar
character of the NLRA's scheme of employee participation
in managerial decision making?
III. SOLIDARITY AND THE "UN-AMERICAN" CHARACTER OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW

Writing in the early 1930s, and some years before the
enactment of the NLRA, the labor economist and historian,
David J. Saposs, declared that
[t]he significant and predominant role of the Catholic Church in
shaping the thought and aspirations of labor is a neglected chapter
in the history of the American labor movement. Its influence
explains, in part at least, why the labor movement in the United
States differs from others, and why it has become more and more
reactionary. 12

In the mid-1990s, the Swedish comparative law scholar,
Reinhold Fahlbeck, published a provocative essay in which
he reflected on "the un-American character of American
labor law."' 13 This law, argued Fahlbeck, with its emphasis
on collective action and on the formation of associations
stands in such stark contrast to the attitudes of the
"archetypal American" as to make the law appear, as
Fahlbeck put it, "somehow un-American."'14 From the
viewpoint of the average American, Fahlbeck observes,
"Those people who want and need concerted action and
unions are not quite reliable. They are not like Americansat-large."15

12. David J. Saposs, The Catholic Church and the Labor Movement, 7 MOD.
MONTHLY 225, 225 (1933).
13. Reinhold Fahlbeck, The Demise of Collective Bargaining in the US.A.:
Reflections on the Un-American Character of American Labor Law, 15
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307 (1994).
14. Id. at 323-24.
15. Id. at 326.
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Understood in the way he is using the term, Fahlbeck
has hold of something important. Our labor law and the
institutions that support it do rest on understandings that
lie outside the American mainstream, and precisely for the
reasons that Saposs so long ago noted. Exact numbers are
difficult to determine. Historically, however, rates of union
membership among Catholics (and Jews) have been vastly
out of proportion to their representation in the American
population. This disproportionality becomes even more
pronounced when the representation of these groups in
union leadership positions is considered. In the United
States at least, the labor movement has been largely a
Catholic phenomenon.
What explains this curious fact? A facile response might
be that Catholics and Jews, as largely poor and
readily
organized
immigrant
groups,
marginalized
standing.
to
improve
their economic
themselves
Undeniably, there is something to this suggestion, but it
does not go very far in explaining the traditionally heavily
Catholic nature of the American labor movement. It is true
that until 1965, when these trends reversed themselves,
American Catholics had lower average incomes, held
positions with lower occupational status, and were less
likely to attend college than Protestants. At the same time,
however, Catholics always have constituted a relatively
small minority of the U.S. population. For example, in 1935,
when Congress passed the NLRA, just over 15 percent of
the population was Catholic. 16 Assuming for the moment
that economic advantage acts as the chief motive for
involvement in the labor movement, Catholics hardly
constituted the only portion of the population with a
substantial self-interest in unionizing. Nevertheless, nonCatholics consistently have proved considerably less
inclined to organizing themselves.
If economic interest does not explain the Catholic
character of the American labor movement, what does?
Two factors, I believe, are crucial. The first concerns the
manner in which Catholics understand the character of
AN
16. THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., THE FIRST MEASURED CENTURY:
ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TRENDS IN AMERICA, 1900-2000 111 (2001) (collecting data

sources). Even today, and after a period of substantial growth during the past
thirty years, Catholics still make-up less than a quarter of the country's
population.
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community, while the second relates to the Church's social
teaching tradition and the consistent support it has given to
organized labor and collective bargaining. 17 Once again,
there seems to be something rather unexpected here. What
made one of the most socially conservative of institutions,
the Catholic Church, such a staunch supporter of unions
and the practice of collective bargaining? Further, how and
in what ways did the Church's social teachings come to
exert an influence upon the shape of the American labor
law scheme?
Lord Wedderburn reminds us that "the language of a
labour law system can be learned only from its social
history, above all the history of its labour movement.
Without a smattering of that vocabulary comparative
conversation is impossible."18 In anyone's vocabulary, few
terms probably bear a closer association with the labor
movement than does the word solidarity. For many
Americans, the terms "solidarity" and "forever" seem
inexorably bound, even though most of us never learned the
rest of the words to this rousing, old trade-union hymn.
Solidarity is the glue that binds the movement and without
which it cannot survive. It also represents a term with
considerable political, social, and religious significance as
well. Given our lack of familiarity with it, a short history of
a complex concept is in order here.

17. This body of teaching is most authoritatively expounded in the Papal
social encyclicals, a line that begins with Leo XIII's influential Rerum novarum

of 1891 and continues into the present day. Encyclicals devoted largely to the
themes of work and economic arrangements include Quadragesimoanno (1931),
Mater et magistra (1961), Laborem exercens (1981), Solicitudo rei socialis
(1987), and Centesimus annus (1991). For an authoritative summary of the
social teachings, see the recently published PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE
AND PEACE, CATHOLIC CHURCH, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE
CHURCH (Liberia Editrice Vaticana 2004).

18. Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, The Social Charter in Britain-Labour
Law and Labour Courts?, 54 MOD. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991).
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IV. SOLIDARITY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A COMPLEX NOTION

A. The Social Question and the Rise of the Notion of
Solidarity
Solidarity, it turns out, is a rather new word. Born out
of the chaos that followed in the wake of the French
Revolution, the term quickly migrated throughout the
industrializing West, drawn along in the backdraft created
by the collapse of long-standing relational structures and
the gaping voids they left. Those first employing the term
had plucked it from the Roman law, where a solidary
obligation refers to a matter in which two or more people
are entitled to or liable for the whole of a debt.
Although Napoleon Bonaparte is said to have coined the
term, 19 no one characterized the social question earlier nor
more memorably than Edmund Burke. In the face of the
forces then being unleashed, Burke warned that the "little
platoons" '20 that gave society its structure would "crumble
away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of
individuality, and at length be dispersed to all the winds of
heaven,"21 leaving men "little better than the flies of
summer. '22 This is the era in which the term "civil society"
first emerged and in which Alexis de Tocqueville, among
others, famously began to insist upon the importance of
associations as a crucial means for securing the well-being
of individuals and democracies alike.
In matters dealing with intellectual or social
transformations, identifying the moment when everything
changed normally is impossible. Such events typically steal
upon us step-by-step and determining the instant at which
everything became new is a bit like attempting to peg the
point at which orange turns to red. That is not the case
with the wholesale upending of social relations that Burke
decried.

19. See 5 DAS WISSEN DES 20.JAHRHUNDERTS:

DAS DEUTSCHE BILDUNGS-

LEXIKON IN SECHS BANDEN, 654-55 (Institut fir Bildung und Wissen 1965).
20. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 53 (Thomas
H.D. Mahoney ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1955) (1790).
21. Id. at 109.
22. Id. at 108.
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The labor was a long one, and the birth pangs sharp,
but modernity, with its thematic insistence on autonomous
individualism, arrived during the night of Tuesday, August
4, 1789. Franqois Furet comments that this
is the most famous date in French parliamentary history: it marks
the moment when a juridical and social order, forged over
centuries, composed of a hierarchy of separate orders, corps, and
communities, and defined by privileges, somehow evaporated,
leaving in its place a social world conceived in a new way as a
collection of free23and equal individuals subject to the universal
authority of law.

Before this night had passed, "the whole structure of the old
society came tumbling down: not only feudal dues but the
whole social order defined in terms of collectivities granted
certain privileges" had been swept away. 24 The first
sentence of Article 1 of the "August Decrees" that
effectuated the spirited declarations made that evening
says it all: "The National Assembly entirely destroys the
feudal regime. '' 25 The venerable intermediary structures
and bodies that anchored one's place in the world, and that
screened the individual from the power of the sovereign and
its law, simply were obliterated.
Just as Martin Luther had understood the relationship
between the soul and its Creator as directly confrontational
and unmediated by institutions, tradition, or the
community of believers (both living and dead), 26 the new
23. Fran4ois Furet, The Night of August 4 in A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 107, 107 (Franqois Furet & Mona Ozouf eds., Arthur
Goldhammer trans., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1989). Furet
continues:
The debate of August 4, 1789, held at night, was in fact associated with
a very powerful feeling in all the deputies that they were witnessing
twilight and a dawn. But even this classical simile cannot do full
justice to the emotions of the participants in this celebrated session,
who for a few hours felt as though they were virtually divine mechanics
helping to bring about this incredible spectacle. This twilight and dawn
were their work.

Id.
24. Id. at 110.

25. Ddcret Relatif a L [sic] Abolition des Privileges, August 11, 1789, 8
ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES 397.

26. On these points, see PAUL VIGNAUX, NOMINALISME AU XIVE SIECLE (1948).
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regime declared every individual equal and autonomous
and brought each of them into a direct and unintercessoried
relationship with the authority of the newly imagined state.
The law now applied directly to each individual and not
mediately through the social body of which they previously
had been a part. Formally, at least, the August Decrees
removed all debilities. Henceforth, "All citizens, without
distinction as to birth, can be admitted to all employments
and ecclesiastical, civil and military dignities, and no useful
profession shall constitute derogation." 27 The ability of
individuals freely to enter any occupation "consecrated the
equality of individuals before the law, a condition of their
union with the nation. ' 28 In a direct reversal of the old
order, the newly unencumbered individual was free to do
anything not directly forbidden by the law. The ground for
an egalitarian society of sovereign individuals who would
act as the autonomous source of their own meaning had
been established. The foundations of the world had shifted.

27. 8 ARCHIVES

PARLEMENTAIRES,

28. Furet, supra note 23, at 110.

supra note 25, at 398.
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B. The Liberal Prejudgment: Why We DistrustAssociations
1. Relational Society and the "CorporateLifestyle." The
stunning events of August 4 may have come as a surprise to
many members of the National Assembly, 29 but that does
not mean that they were not carefully planned. A small
group of about one hundred deputies of the Third Estate,
known as the Breton Club, had met secretly throughout the
night of August 3 and "resolved to use a kind of magic, a
temporary suspension of the Constitution to destroy all
privileges of classes, provinces, cities, and corporations. It
was with this intention that we entered the hall" of the
National Assembly on the following
evening.
"Our
30
committee alone was in on the secret."
Because the abolition of the corporations constituted a
key part of this program of thoroughgoing reform, it is
appropriate to say a word or two about them here. To us,
the term corporation suggests a very specific form of limited
liability business organization, owned by shareholders, that
enjoys special powers and immunities not available to other
forms of business associations. In the usage of the time,
however, the term had particular reference to the guilds
and related associations, the traditional bodies through
which the professions, trades, and most occupations were
organized. 31 The
overlapping
structures
of these
associations or "universities" 32 of masters, which often

29. The deputies to the National Assembly had been considering the text of
the Rights of Man, but the rapidly spreading rural uprising, known as the
Great Fear, forced the deputies to turn their attention to responding to this
emergency. See 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 25, at 339-43.
30. Furet, supra note 23, at 108; see also Spiros Simitis, Die Loi le Chapelier:
Bemerkungen zur Geschichte und m6glichen Wiederentdeckung des
Individuums, 22 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 157, 160 (1989).
31. Adam Smith observes that "[r]egulated companies resemble, in every
respect, the corporations of trades so common in the cities and towns of all the
different countries of Europe." 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 733 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds.,

LibertyClassics 1981) (1776) [hereinafter WN].
32. Smith notes that the incorporated trades "were antiently called
universities; which indeed is the proper Latin name for any incorporation
whatever. The university of smiths, the university of taylors, &c. are
expressions which we commonly meet with in the old charters of the antient
towns." 1 id. at 136.
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dovetailed with statutorily established norms, 33 formed a
comprehensive regulatory framework that gave them
influence over nearly every aspect of economic life by
permitting the guilds substantial control over the
administration
of
of competition.
The
conditions
apprenticeships by the guilds allowed the masters to
restrict entry into the trades and to determine the number
of openings available in the towns for those qualified to
practice their arts. The apprenticeship corporations also
determined the size of the skilled labor pool through their
ability to limit the number of apprentices a master could
take and to fix the number of years of service required of
apprentices and journeymen before they qualified to
practice their art independently. The guilds likewise
possessed, among many other powers, the ability to set the
prices for and to determine the range of goods a master
could offer and to enforce standards for their quality.
Given our contemporary predispositions, it is easy to
regard these partial trade associations simply from an
economic perspective, but doing so both conceals their full
significance as well as the reasons that members of the
Breton Club and like-minded liberals in other places so
earnestly sought their complete extirpation. Properly
understood, the guilds constituted a set of integrated
''cultural institutions" that performed a wide range of
social, educational, moral, religious, fraternal, legal,
administrative, and welfare functions. 34 These diverse
institutions sat at the center of society, embedding
35
individuals within the structures of the local community

33. In the English case, the most important enactment of this sort was the
enormously influential Statute of Artificers, 5 Eliz. c.4 (1563) (Eng.). This far
reaching statute touched on nearly every aspect of economic and social life, and
its provisions on apprenticeships would remain in force until 1814. To be
appreciated properly, the Statute must be considered in light of the extensive
Elizabethan Poor Laws, with which it worked in tandem. As one commentator
notes, the enactment of the Statute "unified the systems then in existence, some
of which had been breaking down, and given them full legal recognition. It
represented a shift to the state of what had previously been more a matter of
local control." K.D.M. Snell, The Apprenticeship System in British History: the
Fragmentationof a CulturalInstitution, 25 HIST. EDUC. 303, 304 (1996).

34. Cf. Snell, supranote 33, at 306.
35. Snell points out that guilds and apprenticeships were "intimately tied to
ideas of the sense of place, 'belonging,"' and in the case of England, to "poor-law
entitlement." Id. at 307. As we shall see, the fact that these institutions
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while forming a dense associational network that united
localities, countries, and-not infrequently-trans-national
regions through formal and informal ties. The English
Company of Clockmakers did not exaggerate in their
ultimately unsuccessful defense of the Elizabethan
apprenticeship law when they claimed in a pamphlet issued
in 1812 that the enemies of the corporations "at the same
time condemn the whole political and commercial
establishment of Britain; which is nothing other than a
grand Corporation, composed of an infinity of smaller
ones." 36 One commentator observes that to their
contemporaries, corporations and apprenticeships were "so
overladen with social and other assumptions and
expectations, so tied to administrative, moral and political
considerations, that any 'economic' analysis which treated it
as a distinct ' 37and separate activity would have been felt
incongruous."

Because they are so different than our own, the
attitudes that supported the "corporate spirit" and the
institutions that embodied it can be difficult for us to
appreciate. They represent a different way of being and
embodied a set of values and understandings that made life
in a relational society both intelligible and possible. 38 From
their inception, the guilds represent an attempt to secure
conditions for some degree of shared self-determination.
and
regulatory
numerous
performed
they
While
administrative tasks, these corporate institutions also
functioned as fraternal and religious sodalities as well. In
addition to caring for the temporal needs of their members,
discouraged labor mobility would constitute one of the grounds upon which
Adam Smith would condemn them.
36. Circular to Members of the Trade (Clockmakers' Company), Sept. 25,
1812, quoted in T.K. Derry, The Repeal of the Apprenticeship Clauses of the
Statute of Apprentices, 3 ECON. HIST. REV. 67, 71 (1931). Snell states that by the

repeal of the apprenticeship clauses of the Statute of Artificers in 1814, the
institution of apprenticeships in England "had probably been in decline for
some decades . . . ." K.D.M. SNELL, ANNALS OF THE LABOURING POOR: SOCIAL
CHANGE AND AGRARIAN ENGLAND, 1660-1900, at 228 (1985). Nevertheless, as

Derry and Snell point out, there was widespread resistance to their repeal.
37. Snell, supra note 33, at 305.
38. For a telling description of these relationships in a time of aristocracy,
see Tocqueville's description in his Introduction to DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
(Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press
2000) (1835).

898

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

the guilds founded colleges, built churches, contributed
altars, cathedral windows, and other memorials to their
deceased members and families, and endowed Masses for
the repose of their souls, a practice that continued in the
Catholic regions of Europe until the eventual suppression of
the guilds in the latter-part of the Nineteenth century. As
one commentator characterized it:
The Gild, which, as we have shown, stood like a loving mother,
providing and assisting, at the side of her sons in every
circumstance in life, cared for her children even after death .... In
this respect, the Craft-Guilds of all countries are alike; and in
reading their statutes, one might fancy sometimes that the old
craftsmen cared only for the well-being of their souls ....We find
innumerable ordinances also as to the support of the sick and poor;
and to afford a settled asylum for distress . . . .The chief care
however of the Gildmen was always directed to the welfare of the
souls of the dead. 39

At the opposite end of the life cycle, the apprenticeship
system sponsored by the guilds involved far more than a
period of skills-training. Lujo Brentano refers to it as "a
kind of novitiate to citizenship."40 In keeping with the
character of the relationship, the candidate's reception into
an apprenticeship typically took place in a solemn ceremony
in the town or guild hall, in the presence of the members,
41
and usually on the feast day of the guild's patron saint.
After hearing a recitation of the moral and practical duties
pertaining to the relationship, an indenture was drawn and
executed which memorialized the act and recited the special
conditions under which the apprentice was placed with the
master. The apprentice then became part of the master's
family. Training included not only instruction in the trade,
but in literacy, numeracy, the management of a household
and a business, as well as moral, religious, and character

39. Lujo BRENTANO, ON THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS, AND THE
ORIGIN OF TRADE-UNIONS 69-70 (London, TrUbner & Co. 1870). A distinguished

economist and historian, Lujo Brentano was the brother of the noted
philosopher, Franz Brentano, the teacher of, among others, Edmund Husserl.
40. Id. at 65.
41. WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., WORK AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE:
LANGUAGE OF LABOR FROM THE OLD REGIME TO 1848, at 34 (1980).
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formation. 42 After completion, the apprentice then could be
received once again into the guild and thereby become a
citizen of the town.
Most of us probably would find the restrictions on
individual choice that accompanied such a system cloying,
and for many unacceptable. In contrast to our views,
however, historian Jfirgen Kocka observes that
[c]ertainly guild members themselves only very rarely would have
found these limits as imposing a menacing dependency or as
oppressively restrictive. No matter how much they may have
treasured being the master of the workshop and the lord of the
house, they did not aim at independence in the sense of a fully
developed freedom of competition and a dynamism unburdened
from the restrictions of tradition. To the trades, growth and
accumulation, superiority and innovation did not appear worth
striving after. Instead, they sought to secure a way of life
appropriate to their place in life in honorable, respectful and
fitting forms of work and living. The restrictions imposed by the
guilds did not contradict the widely held ideal of the trades of an
"honorable living." Rather, as a rule, these restrictions were
greeted as an important means to secure one's living in an
honorable way, through reliable work and a decent life, consonant
with moral customs and not achieved at the cost of one's fellow
tradesmen. This last point is important. Formed by the centuriesold experience of an insufficient or only slowly growing food
supply, members of the traditional trades-in contrast to the
attitudes of the early merchant class-were stamped by the
conviction that the advantage of one must come at the
disadvantage of another. Not only the guild rules, but prevailing
moral convictions forbade one from ruthlessly grabbing whatever
chances the market offered, pursuing them to the full, and
behaving like a capitalist entrepreneur. Defending independence
was part of the comradely bond of guild membership43
institutionally as well as a matter of social morality.

42. See BRENTANO, supra note 39; Snell, supra note 33. Snell notes that this
training covered many female as well as male apprentices. On the
apprenticeship of women, see SNELL, supra note 34, at 270-319, and Snell,
supra note 33, at 305 n.6 (collecting sources).
43. JORGEN KocKA, WEDER STAND NOCH KLASSE: UNTERSCHICHTEN UM 1800,
at 143 (1990). Brentano states that "the principle of the trade-policy of the
craftsmen, namely, that provision should be made to enable every one, wit a
small capital and his labour, to earn his daily bread in his trade freely and
independently, in opposition to the principle of the rich, 'freedom of trade'."
BRENTANO, supra note 39, at 60.
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2. Relational Society and its Critics-Why We Distrust
Associations. A deep and abiding distrust of institutions of
all descriptions, both sacred and secular, lies at the heart of
modern liberalism, which regards them all as posing a
constant threat to the status and freedom of the individual.
This attitude of suspicion mirrors the political nominalism
that informs the modern project and the anthropology that
underlies it. This framework can account only for
individuals. It regards association of whatever form either
in terms of representing an instrumental and transient
alliance among self-seeking but otherwise unassociated
individuals, or it reifies the group (e.g., society) as the
individual, seeing it as the place where the "I" and the "we"
merge. In the narcissistic reverie this latter view posits, the
individual is autonomous because the law that society
imposes is identical with that which the individual has
made. In either account, "partial associations" like the
guilds or the myriad other institutions that Burke describes
as society's "little platoons" end-up being regarded as
factions that threaten both individual freedom and social
peace.
The progenitor of the first account, Thomas Hobbes,
pungently describes corporations of all descriptions as an
"infirmity . . . which are as it were many lesser Commonwealths in the bowels of the greater, like worms in the
that their
entrayles of a naturall man" and darkly warns
44
existence "tend to the dissolution" of the state.
Hobbes' greatest critic, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, agreed
with him, at least on this point. In Rousseau's view, the
''general will" of the people "is always right and always
tends toward the public utility." 45 Nevertheless, Rousseau
warned, "it does not follow that the people's deliberations
always have the same rectitude." Although never corrupt,
the people can be fooled. "If, when an adequately informed
people deliberates, the citizens were to have no
communication among themselves, the general will would
always result," Rousseau instructed. "But when factions,

44. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 375 (C. B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books
1981) (1651).
45. JEAN-JACQUES ROusSEAu, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF

POLITICAL RIGHT 61 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., St.
Martins Press 1978) (1762).
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partial associations at the expense of the whole, are
formed," the will not of individuals, but only of the
associations is stated. In this case, "there are no longer as
many voters as there are men, but merely as many as there
are associations." As a result, "for the general will to be well
expressed, it is therefore important that there be no partial
society in the State, and that each citizen give only his own
opinion." Should it be impossible to suppress the partial
societies, "their number must be multiplied, and their
inequality prevented," advice46 subsequently carefully
47
attended to both by Adam Smith and James Madison.
Modernity conducted its vigorous campaign to liberate
the individual from institutions along a broad front. One of
the leading figures in this long march against the
structures was Adam Smith, an influential and implacable
critic of apprenticeships, the "corporation spirit," and of
institutions generally. 48 Were he alive today, one could
almost feature him wearing a "Rage Against the Machine"
tee-shirt. Smith based his critique of the corporations, or
what he called the "inequalities occasioned by the policy of
Europe," on both efficiency and liberty grounds. The
efficiency argument was threefold. The policy of Europe, "by
not leaving things at perfect liberty," restrained
''competition in some employments to a smaller number
than would otherwise be disposed to enter them" while
"increasing it in others beyond what it naturally would
46. This, for example, is Smith's answer to the problem of religion: "The
interested and active zeal of teachers of religion," he states, "can be dangerous
and troublesome only where there is, either but one sect tolerated in the society,
or where the whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects...
" If, however, the "society is divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps into
as many thousand small sects, of which no one could be considerable enough to
disturb the publick tranquility." 2 WN, supra note 31, at 793-94.
47. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

48. Nathan Rosenberg notes that "The Wealth of Nations can be read, and
should be read as a systematic critique of human institutions" and that in his
work, "Smith subjected most of the basic institutions of his day-including the
economy, the government, the church and the educational system-to searching
and far-reaching criticism." Nathan Rosenberg, Adam Smith as a Social Critic,
ROYAL BANK OF SCOT. REV., June 1990, at 17-33 (1990). Emma Rothschild
observes that "Smith believed that he was uncovering eternal truths about
social institutions. These truths took the form, quite often, of abstract principles
about personal character and personal oppression." EMMA ROTHSCHILD,
ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 114
(2001).
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be."' 49 Lastly, it obstructed "the free circulation of labour
and stock, both from employment to employment and from
place to place." 50
Because such policies offend basic human liberty, they
are unjust. In language firmly rooted in John Locke's labor
theory of property and value, 51 Smith states that "[t]he
property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the
original foundation of all other property, so it is the most
sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man," he
continues, "lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands."
Consequently, "to hinder him from employing this strength
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without
injury to his neighbor is a plain violation of this most sacred
property." Laws or other restrictions that hinder "one from
working at what he thinks proper" and that obstruct
"others from employing whom they think proper" constitute
a "manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the
workman" and those disposed to employ him. 52 Justice lay
in affording unrestricted individual choice.
Smith's thoroughgoing distrust of institutions leads him
to make a series of concrete suggestions for retarding the
growth and spread of the "corporation spirit" that makes
them possible. 53 "People of the same trade," Smith tartly

49. Smith's prime example here is the Church. Both the public and the
"piety of private founders have established many pensions, scholarships" and
the like to support the education of churchmen, which results, Smith says, in
"the church being crowded with people, who in order to get employment, are
willing to accept a much smaller recompense" than their education otherwise
would have allowed. He also unfavorably compares the Church in "England and
in all Catholick countries," where "the lottery of the church is in reality much
more advantageous than necessary" to the "churches of Scotland, of Geneva,
and of several other protestant churches" whose "much more moderate
benefices will draw a sufficient number of learned, decent, and respectable men
into holy orders." 1 WN supra note 31, at 146, 148.
50. 2 WN, supra note 31, at 135. See generally ROTHSCHILD, supra note 48,
at 87-115 (presenting a thorough analysis of the grounds of Smith's opposition
to apprenticeships and the corporation spirit).
51. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in Two
TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 265, 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1689-90).

52. 1 WN, supra note 31, at 138.
53. The Church, that "great incorporation" represents a special target of
Smith's critique. Its clergy, Smith counsels, "can act in concert, and pursue
their interest upon one plan and with one spirit, as much as if they were under
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warned, "seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against
the publick . . . ."54 While the law "cannot hinder people of
the same trade from sometimes assembling together,"
Smith counseled, it should do nothing whatever to
encourage their collaboration. 55 A regulation that requires
the registration of all those practicing a particular trade,
observes Smith, simply facilitates their organizing.
Likewise, "[a] regulation which enables those of the same
trade to tax themselves in order to provide for their poor,
their sick, their widows and orphans" only conduces to give
"them a common interest to manage" and renders their
assembly necessary. 56 Lastly, an incorporation also "makes
the act of the majority binding upon the whole" which
permits much more effective restrictions on trade since it
withdrawing and thereby
precludes individuals from
57
dissolving the combination.
Whatever else it might represent, the Enlightenment
denotes both a set of wide-ranging philosophical attitudes
as well as an intellectual and social movement, centered in
France, but with its votaries united in a conversation that
stretched across Europe and reached deeply into the United
States. As the ties among the leading lights of the French
and Scottish Enlightenment demonstrate, the members of
this loose sect typically had a close familiarity with each
other's work, and not infrequently, personal relationships
with one another as well. In 1776, for example, the abbe
Morellet, a leading French economic theorist, political
activist, and friend of, among others, Adam Smith, David
Hume, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin, wrote to
his colleague, the economist Turgot, to tell him that the
the direction of one man; and they are frequently too under such direction." 2
WN, supra note 31, at 797. Smith counsels that the "great antidote" to the
"poison of enthusiasm and superstition" that religion induces is science. The
second remedy, he suggests, "is the frequency and gaiety of publick diversions,
"which would dissipate, in the greater part of them, that melancholy and
gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and
enthusiasm." For a summary of Smith's critique of religion and the Church, see
id. at 788-816.
54. 1 WN, supra note 31, at 145.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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police had seized a section of the Wealth of Nations dealing
with corporations and apprenticeships that Morellet
recently had translated at Turgot's behest. Because the
authorities regarded the extract from Smith as supporting
Turgot's criticism of the established order, the diarist Metra
5
wrote that "one could never get permission" to publish it.8
Just two years later, another of Turgot's circle, Dupont de
Nemours, wrote to Smith telling him that "[w]e are moving
rapidly towards a good constitution," and thanking him
because "[y]ou have done much to speed this useful
59
revolution."
3. Suppressing the Middle: The Loi de Chapelier. The
abolition of every possible mediating group represented a
crucial part of this revolutionary effort to reconstitute
society for the new Adam, the human reconceived in the
light of reason, a concept itself now newly understood.
Nevertheless, despite their sweeping character, or perhaps
precisely because of it, the August Decrees did not explicitly
do away with the guilds. That would not occur until the
enactment of Le Chapelier's Law nearly two years later.
The cursory summary of resolutions reached by the
National Assembly on the night of the fourth that appears
in the Parliamentary Archives mentions only "the
reformation of the guilds," although it might be noted in
passing that this synopsis reads a bit like a bleary-eyed
celebrant's morning-after attempt to reconstruct the events
of a particularly cheery evening. The final decree, issued
after a week of complicated and more sober wrangling, did
not refer to the guilds at all. The closest mention it made to
them was the abolishment of "the particular privileges of
the provinces, principalities, regions, cantons, cities and
communities of inhabitants. ' 60
These efforts to root the middle out of society left the
reformers with a difficult problem. It is one thing boldly to
declare the abolishment of the feudal regime. It is another
thing to determine just what this really means and how far

58. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 48, at 87. On the extensive body of writing
concerning Turgot's influence on Smith, see the sources collected in id. at 281
n.52.
59. Id. at 54.
60. 8 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES, supra note 25, at 398.
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the destruction job ought to go. The devil always lurks in
the details, and the details in this case presented a
particularly devilish dilemma. On the one hand, agreement
existed all around that citizens had the right to assemble
and to form associations. On the other, great concern
existed that these associations not serve as replacements
for the intermediary bodies and structures that the
National Assembly had sought to abolish through the
August Decrees. The needle to be threaded involved
recognizing the right of individuals to associate with one
another, but somehow preventing that activity from
producing new intermediate institutions.
Condorcet well-captured the tension between these two
61
positions in his 1789 pamphlet, Declaration of Rights,
which deeply influenced the final version of the Declaration
of the Rights of Man, which the National Assembly would
enact just days after its issuance of the August Decrees. In
a section of the pamphlet entitled, "Dangers to the Right of
Equality," Condorcet wrote that "[a]ll citizens enjoy the
right to form free associations, but they cannot be
recognized as such by the power of the legislature or by the
government." A group of nobles, lawyers, or metalworkers
may form an association for deliberation and debate as they
choose. Nevertheless, Condorcet continued, such groups
may not assume the form or function of an intermediate
body or a corporation. "Citizens in the state are divided only
by districts and by officials charged by the citizens with
public functions; each association is thus necessarily a
private association that has the right to be free, but that
62
does not have the right to act as a corporation."
Consequently, "bodies of priests of different religions, a
military corps, or the corps of jurists have no right to a
political existence different than those of theatre
subscribers or of members of a club, without which natural
equality would be destroyed. '6 3 In other words, citizens
61. DtCLARATION DES DROITS, reprinted in IX MARIE JEAN ANTOINE NICOLAS
DE CARITAT MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, OEUVRES 208 (A. Condorcet O'Connor &

M.F. Arago eds., 1968) (1847-49).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 208-09. Thinking of priests, military officers, or lawyers as part of
a corporate structure may seem odd to us, but as Sewell notes, 'The nobility,
the clergy, chivalric orders, and even orders of monks and friars were legally
recognized, privileged, internally regulated, semiautonomous bodies organized
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were free to form groups, but as Spiros Simitis observes,
those groups would be tolerated "only as a means to the
better preparation of individual activity."64 The freedom to
associate could not be employed to restore the mediating
institutions that only shortly before had given society its
structure.
While the complete suppression of the guilds and
corporations would not come until the passage of Le
Chapelier's Law in June, 1791, their eventual fate, like that
of other forms of mediating institutions, was never in doubt.
"There were no intermediate stops on the way to the
individual," 65 or on the way to the radically individualistic
society that the reformers intended to create. The
Declaration of the Rights of Man said nothing concerning
the corporations, but in an accompanying enactment
explicating the "application of the principles" set forth in
the Declaration,the National Assembly stated in part that
in order to secure the "blessings of liberty and the equality
of rights ... there are no longer jurandes,66 nor corporations
of the professions, the arts, or the trades. '67 To drive home
the point concerning groups and sodalities, the document
further provided that "[t]he law recognizes neither religious
vows nor any other engagement that would be contrary to
natural rights or to the constitution. ' 68 Like Luther's
understanding that the relationship between God and man
is unmediated by the Church, visible or invisible, for the
new state, neither one's religious community nor one's god
could come between it and the individual citizen.
in a fashion analogous to trade corporations," as were the universities and the
legal and medical professions. SEWELL, supra note 41, at 25.
64. Simitis, supra note 30, at 161.
65. Id.
66. The jurande was a "sworn trade" (a mtiere jure), "so called because its
members were required to swear (jure) an oath of loyalty upon entering the
mastership." The jurande enjoyed a heightened legal status. Recognized as a
constituting a single "body and community" (corps et communaute) which was
invested with privileges and immunities, the jurande constituted a fictive
person which stood in the place of individual persons. The grant of privileges
allowed these bodies to make private law for their members, who were immune
from the law of the community. See SEWELL, supra note 41, at 26-27.
67. MAURICE BOUVIER-AJAM, HISTOIRE DU TRAVAIL EN FRANCE DES ORIGINES
LA R9VOLUTION 695 (1957).

68. Id. at 695.
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The National Assembly would take two cuts at
addressing the status of the corporations before enacting Le
Chapelier's Law in June 1791. The first came through a
proposal, made by the Committee on Taxation in February
1791, to impose a licensing fee on persons practicing their
trade or profession. The "moderate" fee the Committee
proposed would replace the membership charges levied by
the guilds and professional bodies, and thereby do away
with them altogether.
The Committee supported its proposal with equity
arguments. The corporate system, it observed, imposed an
indirect tax both on consumers and producers. In language
strongly reminiscent of Adam Smith's, the Committee
argued that "the right to work is one of the first rights of
man. This right is his property ... it is without doubt the
69
first property, the most sacred, the most imprescriptible.
The proposed law would "efface these last vestiges of
servitude" that the "tyrannical" corporate system imposed
and would respect "the property of the citizen, and above
all, the liberty and dignity of man. ' 70 The National
Assembly lost little time adopting it.
Several weeks later, the Assembly again addressed the
question of associations when it took up a proposal, made
by the Committee on the Constitution, to limit the right to
petition the government strictly to individuals. 71 "The right
to petition is an individual right," insisted the Chair of the
Committee, Issac Ren6 Guy Le Chapelier. 72 "Consequently,
no corps, no administration, no society can exercise the
undelegable right of petition," and no petition can be made
in a collective name. 73 Le Chapelier acknowledged that
individuals enjoyed the right to associate with one another
to discuss and deliberate about public issues. Nevertheless,
he maintained, "if the law offers a means for publishing the
result of their deliberations, [such groups] soon will become
69. Rapport du Comitg des Contributions Publiques sur les Patentes,
February 15, 1791, 23 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES 198, 199.
70. Id.
71. Rapport du comite de Constitution sur la pdtition faite & l'Assemblge
nationale, le 26 avril 1791, par les administrateursdu ddpartement de Paris,
May 9, 1791, 25 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES 678.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 679.
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a subjugating body, a menacing authority, a power contrary
to the whole system of representative government," whose
views "necessarily will represent the results of the decisions
taken by74 the majority" and not those of the objecting
minority.
Among the most vociferous opponents of this proposal
was Robespierre, who pointedly observed that "[t]he weaker
and more unfortunate a man is, the more he is in need, the
more he has need of the prayers of others. ' 75 The proposed
law, he insisted, would injure the poor and the weak, who
have the greatest need for collective action. In a voice
shaking with passion, Robespierre argued that the proposal
is contrary to natural law, and I maintain that since each isolated
individual has the right to petition, it is not possible for you to
prohibit a collection of men, of whatever title or whatever name it
forward
carries, that you prohibit it, I say, the faculty of 7putting
6
its views and addressing them [to those in power].

Robespierre's objections, along with those raised by several
other critics, including the Bishop of Blois and Potion, were
every bit as forceful as they were unavailing. The
Committee's proposal became law a few days thereafter.
The final step in the movement that began on the
fabled night of August 4, 1789 came nearly two years later
with Le Chapelier's introduction of his law to outlaw all
"assemblies of citizens of the same estate or profession."77
Speaking on behalf of the Constitutional Committee that
formally had proposed the law, Le Chapelier asserted that,
in spite of the August Decrees, "many persons" had abused
the freedom to associate "to attempt to recreate the
abolished corporations in the form of assemblies of arts and
trades" by organizing them in the names of their officers.
"Without doubt, the right of assembly belongs to every
citizen," Le Chapelier acknowledged, "but there is no right
that permits citizens of certain professions to assemble for
their pretended common interests." Then, in words that

74. Id.
75. Id. at 685.
76. Id.

77. Rapport du comiti de Constitution sur les assemblies de citoyens de
mime 4tat ou profession, June 14, 1791, 27 ARcHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES 210.
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could have come from the mouth of Rousseau himself, Le
Chapelier ringingly declared, "Corporations no longer exist
in the state; there is only the particular interest of each
individual and the general interest. No one is permitted to
inspire an intermediate interest among the citizens that
separates
them from the state through a corporative
spirit."78
The true goal of these associations, Le Chapelier
complained, had nothing to do with deliberations, but with
attempts to establish work rules and wage rates for workers
in various cities, and "to prevent workers and the
individuals who employ them in their workshops from
making private agreements" over such matters. The
assemblies "had even employed violence" and "forced
workers to quit their shops," he asserted, to obtain
compliance with their demands. "Already several
workshops [in Paris] have risen-up" and various other
disorders have been reported. 79 Not only did these
associations threaten public order. They also upset the
principle of "free agreement" by which individuals are to
establish the terms of their relationship themselves,
through direct one-on-one negotiation, free of any form of
third-party interference or intervention. Obstructing this
freedom would lead only to a situation of "absolute
dependence" that would push workers0 into privation and
thereby, into a state "close to slavery."8
Le Chapelier also accused the assemblies of having
used "specious motives" to gain permission from the
authorities to organize. Many of these associations, he
maintained, claimed that they existed in part to supply aid
to members of the same trade or profession who were ill, in
need, or unemployed. Such "relief funds may appear to be
useful," Le Chapelier warned, "but one should make no
mistake about this assertion." Caring for the infirm, the
unemployed and the needy, he insisted, is a task for the
state and public officials, not for private bodies. The
distribution of help by these private associations, when not
made "dangerous by their bad administration, tends at the
least to result in the rebirth of the corporations; it requires
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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the frequent reunion of individuals of the same profession,
the nomination of syndics and other officers, the formation
of those who have not
of regulations" and the exclusion
"submitted" themselves to them.8 1
To preclude the "rebirth of privileges" and "to prevent
the progress of this disorder" which "these wretched
societies" had spread, Le Chapelier called for the enactment
of a new law, the first article of which embodies both the
spirit of the law and of the age: "The destruction of all types
of corporations of citizens of the same estate and profession
being one of the fundamental bases of the French
constitution, it is forbidden to reestablish them under any
pretext or form whatsoever. '8 2 Despite questions from the
right about the effect of the law on political clubs and other
associations, and requests for further deliberations about
the impact of the law on the right of association, the
National Assembly quickly passed Le Chapelier's proposal.
The work began the night of August 4th was now complete.
The age of the emancipated individual had begun.
The passage of Le Chapelier's Law also marked the end
of his notable public career. A lawyer from Rennes, he had
presided over the National Assembly on the night of the
fourth and had played a leading role in many of the central
events that occurred during the first years of the
Revolution. Upon the expiration of his mandate, Le
Chapelier returned home, but not to a quiet life. As the
Revolution followed the increasingly violent path that
Burke had foreseen, Le Chapelier was accused on several
occasions of "moderatism," and finally, of spying on behalf
of England. He died on the guillotine on April 22, 1794, not
quite three years after the passage of his namesake law.8 3
4. Summary and Assessment. Both the August Decrees
and Le Chapelier's Law proved to be far longer-lived than
the man who had played such a key role in their enactment.
As Frangois Furet notes, while many of the institutions and
legislative initiatives that the French Revolution produced
were temporary, "the most important thing" about the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. On the details of Le Chapelier's biography, see Simitis, supra note 30, at
159-60.
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August Decrees and Le Chapelier's Law "was that they
survived. 84a Unlike nearly every other piece of legislation of
and only
the period, the latter statute remained unamended
85
was repealed late in the nineteenth century.
The changes wrought by the "divine mechanics '8 6 of the
Enlightenment spread across Europe and left no place
arrangements
were
untouched. Everywhere, feudal
abolished and the structures, practices and institutions that
once had given society its form were razed. The creation
"without concessions" and within a very short period of time
"of a wholly modern, individualistic society," Furet
observes, posed a truly novel and fundamental problem.
"What had to be worked out now," he remarks, for this
completely new "society of free and equal individuals"
would be the sense in which those sovereign, independent,
rights-bearing individuals might be related to and united
with one another.8 7 This problem represents the very
essence of the "social question."
Attempts to respond to the social question dominate the
history of the nineteenth century and many of the era's
bloodiest and most poignant struggles were fought over it.
Marxism and the many strains of socialism, anarchism,
various forms of nationalism, religious and secular utopian
experiments, assorted initiatives to replace wage labor with
producer co-operatives, worker movements of every stripe
and a variety of employer sponsored programs of welfare
capitalism represent just some of the attempts to address
the social question. Each of these programmatic remedies
sought to establish a new foundation for community and to
resolve the exigencies that the new conditions had
produced.
Despite the passage of time, the social question remains
a pressing contemporary challenge. Once largely an
American concern, the spread of a certain form of detached
individualism now challenges the health of democracies
everywhere. Likewise, even as our economies and our legal
increasingly
and
political
systems
are
becoming

84. Furet, supra note 23, at 112.
85. Simitis, supranote 30, at 158.
86. See BURKE, supra note 20, at 105.

87. Furet, supra note 23, at 113.
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interdependent and globalized, the basis for our
commonality in the still fragile and unsteadily evolving new
world order remains unclear. The notion of solidarity stands
as one of the most influential and significant attempt to
respond to the issues that the social question poses.
V. RESPONSE AND INNOVATION: THE SOCIAL QUESTION,
SOLIDARITY AND THE CATHOLIC CONTRIBUTION

A. Community and the "CatholicImagination"
The collapse of the obsolete feudal and customary
relational structures, the accompanying revolution in
human self-understanding and mores, the subsequent
extensions of political and economic rights, along with
innovations in agricultural practices and industrial
production had just the sort of atomizing and disorienting
effects that Edmund Burke had predicted. These
transformations and advances resulted in the formulation
and extension of formal individual freedoms, at least to
many, but they brought tremendous and wrenching social
dislocations with them.
Emancipated from the hierarchical structures and
social bonds that once determined their place in life,
individuals also were placed outside the complex set of
reciprocal duties that previously had protected the
vulnerable through the obligations that they imposed on
the strong. Without the presence of bodies that could
mediate the relationship between them, increasing
numbers of people stood exposed to the growing power of
market institutions and to the expanding claims of the
newly-rising state. Many contemporary observers also
warned that the dissolution and fragmentation of social ties
not only threatened the possibility of democratic self-rule,
but the proper unfolding of human personality as well. Of
particular concern in the debates over the social question
were the problems of the growing numbers of industrial
workers. Identifying and developing structures that would
integrate them into society, relieve their precarious
economic status, and afford them opportunities for effective
and authentic self-determination became the primary, if
never the exclusive focus of the social discussion.
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Some sense of pre-Revolutionary society gives a better
feeling for the challenges that those attempting to address
the social question faced. Prior to the changes that occurred
in the wake of the Revolution (changes that typically were
initiated not from the bottom-up, but from the top-down),
everyone, no matter how lowly their station, was woven into
the social fabric and had an integral part in it. Historian
Jiirgen Kocka points out that in this social order, one might
be "at the bottom, but included" [unten, aber einbezogen],
and he uses the processions that traditionally accompany
the celebration of the Catholic feast of Corpus Christi [the
Body of Christ] to illustrate the point.88 The rich symbolism
surrounding this feast reveals much about distinctly
of and attitudes toward
Catholic understandings
both the notion of solidarity
shaped
have
that
community
American labor movement
the
of
character
the
as
as well
it is worth a
Consequently,
law.
labor
and American
moment or two to familiarize ourselves with its some of its
meanings.
Corpus Christi celebrates the institution of the
Eucharist, the central sacrament of the Catholic Church.
According to Catholic belief, the bread and wine
consecrated by the priest during the Mass become, as the
classic formulation has it, "the body and blood, the soul and
the divinity" of Christ. To Catholics, there is nothing
symbolic about the Eucharist.8 9 Instead, through their
reception of it, the faithful understand themselves literally
to be feeding on the divine body and blood of their Savior.
In consuming the Eucharist, they become united with
Christ to form a single body that transcends place and time.
Consequently, the sacrament often is referred to as
communion since it unifies the faithful, both living and
dead, in one body, where the good of each is communicated
to all the others. The pelican early became a symbol for
Christ in the Eucharist, since it was thought that when the

88. KOCKA, supra note 43, at 112-15.
89. Flannery O'Connor pointedly summed-up the Catholic attitude toward
the sacrament in her retort to the suggestion of her fellow novelist, Mary
McCarthy, that one should understand the Eucharist as a symbol: "If it's just a
symbol, the hell with it."
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female bird lacked other food, she would peck at her breast
and nourish her young with droplets of her own blood. 90
Corpus Christi embodies and represents these
understandings. The feast falls in early summer and its
celebration unfolds as a colorful, day-long event. In Catholic
areas of Europe, towns were (and to a surprising extent,
still are) hung with flags, banners and flowers to mark the
day, and the squares and other public areas decorated with
"living pictures" and with elaborate displays made of multicolored soil. In older days, plays and pageant wagons
illustrating religious themes often were part of the day's
proceedings. A procession with the Eucharist marks the
high-point of the celebration, and in pre-Revolutionary
Europe, also mirrored the community's understanding of
itself and its organic order.
During the procession, the priest or bishop walks
beneath a canopy while carrying before him a consecrated
host ensconced in a glass-fronted device called a
monstrance. Nearly the entire adult population of the town
would escort him, arranged in ranks reflecting the
marcher's station and role in the community, and
accompanied by musicians. As one commentator noted,
"generally speaking, the nearer the canopy, the more
honorable the place." 91 Often, the canopy and the
monstrance came at the rear of the procession. Marching
before it would come the congregations of men and women
religious, the mayor and town council, the merchants and
traders, and then the various guilds, the masters and
journeymen processing together, each corporate body
carrying banners bearing the image of its patron saint and
the symbol of its trade. Preceding them and also carrying
their flags came the unskilled day-laborers, the shepherds

90. Not surprisingly, one of the great medieval hymns still traditionally
sung on the feast of Corpus Christi also employs the imagery of the pelican:
"Bring the tender tale true of the Pelican; Bathe me, Jesu Lord, in what thy
bosom ran---Blood whereof a single drop has power to win, All the world
forgiveness of its world of sin." Thomas Aquinas, Adoro Te Devote (Lost, All
Lost in Wonder), as translated by the poet, Gerard Manley Hopkins. The whole
of the Hopkins translation can be found in GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS, THE
POETICAL WORKS OF GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS 112 (Norman H. Mackenzie ed.,
1992).
91. ALOIS MITTERWIESER, Geschichte der Fronletchnamsprozession in
Bayern, 97 (1930), quoted in KOCKA, supra note 43, at 114.
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and field-hands, and the town's poor. United by the
Eucharist, the town's inhabitants marched as a host, with
each of its members part of a smaller body that integrated
them into the whole.
The place of the marcher in the procession reflects their
place in the social, political, and economic order, but two
points should be noted. Firstly, no matter how lowly, each
part of the social body reflected in the processional order
had a dignity of its own. Further, the honor of place in the
procession is not a sign of the individual's own virtue or
presumed favor in the eyes of the Deity. As Alexis de
Tocqueville observed, "Among Catholics, religious society is
composed only of two elements: the priest and the people.
The priest alone is raised above the faithful: everything is
equal below him." Consequently, in matters of faith and
morals, "Catholicism places the same standard on all
intellects; it forces the details of the same beliefs on the
learned as well as the ignorant" and it "imposes the same
practices on the rich as on the poor." The faith
"compromises with no mortal, and applying the same
measure to each human, it likes to intermingle all classes of
society at the foot of the same altar, as they are
intermingled in the eyes of God." For these reasons,
Tocqueville adds, "If Catholicism disposes the faithful to
obedience, it does not therefore prepare them for inequality.
I shall say the contrary of Protestantism, which generally
'92
brings men much less to equality than to independence.
The differences between the two attitudes illustrate the
effects of what the sociologist
Andrew Greeley calls "the
'93
Catholic imagination.
The rise of the notion of solidarity represents an effort
to find substitutes for the integrated and compact social
unity that the Corpus Christi procession once mirrored. The
term suggests elements that its proponents found missing
from the new order: a sense of unity and indivisibility, a
recognition of individual interdependence and mutual
obligation, a basis for co-operative relationships, an
acknowledgement of duty of society toward its weakest
members, the creation of conditions for the development of
networks of small groups and associations through which
92. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 38, at 276.
93. See ANDREW GREELEY, THE CATHOLIC IMAGINATION (2000).
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individuals-and particularly the less strong-could gain
concrete and significant opportunities for self-responsibility
and self-determination. These things once formed the
ingredients of the specifically political form of friendship
that the ancients viewed as necessary to the maintenance of
a flourishing polity. In the post-Enlightenment world,
however, a coolly rational self-interest had supplanted the
more optimistic idea of friendship as the basis for society.
As Tocqueville commented, in this "world altogether new'
the "instinctive love" that once bound people to their
country and their fellow citizens, and that motivated
"disinterested" and at times heroic efforts to secure their
well-being "is fleeing away without return."94 A new word
and a new sentiment had to be found to replace the old. For
many, solidarity would come to be that substitute.

B. Assessing the Catholic Contribution
Solidarity is a true florilegium, a collection of the ideas,
experiences, reflections, and insights of diverse individuals
and groups across various places and times. 95 Prominent
among those responsible for germinating, cultivating, and
propagating the idea, however, has been a group of thinkeractivists whose work makes-up an essential part of what
now is known as the Catholic social thought tradition. From
the start, those working in this tradition have played a
leading role in working-out both the notion of solidarity and
the practical means for its realization as they attempted to

94. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 38, at 225-26

95. Remarking on the many meanings that the term solidarity has assumed,
J.E.S. Hayward notes that
[t]he ambitious attempt at fusion within a single concept-solidarityof a plurality of distinct, often disparate and divergent ideas, led to
confusion. It led to intellectual confusion: the imperfectly fused and
imprecise elements subsumed under the denomination 'solidarity'
meaning different things to different persons at the same time, and,
frequently, different things to the same person at different times,
owing to the changing emphasis on particular aspects of this principle,
embarrassingly rich in its many facets .... The vacuum left by the

retreat of religion was provisionally occupied by the laic dogma of
'Solidarity' .....

J.E.S. Hayward, The Idea of Solidarity in French Social and Political Thought
in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, at vi-vii (1958) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of London) (on file with author).
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address the social question. As the political theorist, J.E.S.
Hayward, notes, "it was amongst the Roman Catholic social
theologists . . .that the idea of solidarity first achieved its
pivotal social significance and underwent an evolution that
prefigured its subsequent philosophic prominence and
temporary political preeminence." In Britain, Hayward
continues, "Feudalism and Catholicism had been eliminated
as major politico-social forces by the early nineteenth
century." In France (and in the Western and Southern
regions of Germany), however,
Roman Catholicism remained an immensely powerful opponent of
the individualist ideas that had swept all before them almost
unopposed in Britain. It is therefore comprehensible that . . .the

Church should have initially become the rallying point for antiindividualism and that the appeal to solidarity should take the
constitution,
form of a campaign for a return to its politico-social
96
even when its spiritual message had been rejected.
VI. SOLIDARITY AT WORK: THE SOCIAL THOUGHT TRADITION
AND AMERICAN LABOR LAW

Writing in 1861, one of the most notable figures in the
social tradition, Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler, captured
the disorientation and uncertainty that permeated the era,
and the challenge to which the social tradition would seek
to respond. "We are standing at the end of a time," he
observed, "in which all the old dwellings that our Catholic
forebearers had furnished have been razed, and where we
Catholics have not yet quite sorted out how we should takeup residence in the new order of things." 97 Like many
others, Ketteler would devote much of his life to puzzling
out effective means to allow people to take up their home in
a "world altogether new."
What those active in the social thought tradition
proposed as concrete solutions to the social question as it
implicates economic arrangements, legal institutions and

96. Id. at xl.
97. Wilhelm Emmanuel Freiherr von Ketteler, Vorwart to FREIHEIT,
AUTORITAT UND KIRCHE in Ab.I, Bd.1, SAMTLICHE WERKE UND BRIEFE:
SCHRIFTEN, AUFSATZE UND REDEN 1848-1866, at 227 (Erwin Iserloh, Christoph
Stoll, Emil Valasek, Norbert Jager eds., 1977).
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working-life took an astonishing variety of forms that
evolved over time. From the beginning, however, proposals
to afford workers status, participation in and responsibility
for decision making constituted a core part of their agendas.
For example, as early as 1819, the romantic social critic,
political economist and early Catholic social theorist, Adam
MUller, called for the creation of a "reliable station in civil
society" for the rising body of property-less workers then
living on the shadowy periphery of what was still a classbased society, and affording them legal rights that would
put them on a footing equal to that enjoyed by independent,
middle-class citizens. Fifteen years later, Franz von Baader,
another early contributor to the social thought tradition,
attempted to concretize some of MUller's program by
advocating the creation of a new legal framework that
would have provided for the right of workers to be
in
the
parliaments
of the
estates
represented
decision
in
(Standeversammulungen) and to participate
98
making through self-elected representatives.
As the century progressed, those active in the social
thought movement proposed everything from romantic
efforts to reconstruct society by organizing workers of every
description into occupational groups whose place in the
social order would be determined not by the capital they
owned, but the type and significance of the work they
performed to society, to attempts to establish a network of
producer co-operatives, profit sharing schemes, various
sorts of worker representation schemes, 99 and a great deal
else. 10 0 Because these experiments went forward over a
number of decades, they changed in response to rapidly
changing circumstances and to lessons taught through
practical failures.
98. On these points and for further discussion, see Franz Josef Stegmann
and Peter Langhorst, Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in deutschen Katholizismus,
in WALTER EUCHNER ET AL., GESCHICHTE DER SOZIALEN IDEEN IN DEUTSCHLAND:
SOZIALISMUS-KATHOLISCHE SOZIALLEHRE-PROTESTANTISCHE SOZIALETHIK:

EIN

HANDBUCH 700 ff. (Helga Grebing ed., 2000).
99. On the development of worker representation schemes, see FRANZ JOSEF
IN
STEGMANN, DER SOZIALE KATHOLIZISMUS UND DIE MITBESTIMMUNG
DEUTSCHLAND: VOM BEGINN DER INDUSTRIALISIERUNG BIS ZUM JAHRE 1933 (1978).

100. Some of these programmatic efforts calling for corporate representation
of workers and employers anticipated the structures of that the great legal
theorist, social democrat, and father of German labor law, Hugo Sinzheimer,
would include in provisions in the Weimar Constitution.

2005]

NOTION OF SOLIDARITY

919

Regardless of their particular structure and details,
however, all of the undertakings initiated by Catholic social
activists shared three essential characteristics that have
remained constant themes of the social tradition into the
present day. Their proposals attempt in some way to
ground individuals in a group, association or body of some
sort. These structures provide individuals with defense in
depth, since they buffer or mediate the relationship
between their members and the large institutions of the
market or the state. At the same time, through their
involvement in them, each of these mediating structures
also aims at enhancing the status of individuals by
selfeffective
for
opportunities
their
increasing
workplace.
the
without
determination, both within and
Lastly, these mediating bodies tend to overlap or dovetail
with each other, thereby building-up a new ecology of
interwoven and interdependent social institutions that
stand free of the state, and that put an emphasis on selfsufficiency.
As mentioned, one of the central figures in the
formation of the social thought tradition and the
development of the notion of solidarity is Wilhelm Emanuel
Freiherr ("Baron") von Ketteler (1811-1877). Trained as a
lawyer, he resigned his position in the Prussian
bureaucracy to protest the Prussian government's policies
concerning the church and its jailing of the Archbishop of
Cologne, and studied for the priesthood. Consecrated as the
Bishop of Mainz in 1850 when he was just thirty-nineyears-old, Ketteler played a role in several of the significant
events of his time. Among many other things in the course
of a busy life, Ketteler was a delegate to the doomed
Frankfurter Parliament of 1848 that proposed to give
Prussia a constitutional monarchy and to guarantee basic
civil liberties. Often at odds with the Prussian authorities,
the
during
great opponent
Bismarck's
was
he
"Kulturkampf' during which he was arrested twice. Along
with the great British liberal, Lord Acton, Ketteler formed
part of a minority group opposed to the declaration of papal
infallibility by the short-lived First Vatican Council. 0°1
101. The Council was opened in December, 1869, interrupted by the
outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 and never resumed. Reflecting
part of the basis of their opposition, Acton, Ketteler and others were referred to
as the "Inopportunists."
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Ketteler began his long engagement with issues
surrounding the social question in a series of public lectures
he held in 1848, the same year that Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels published The Communist Manifesto.
Working within a moving viewpoint, Ketteler's positions
evolved with time and experience. Deeply influenced by the
then recently-rediscovered thought of Thomas Aquinas,
Ketteler also drew from a wide variety of sources, including
the renowned socialist, Ferdinand Lassalle, with whom
Ketteler maintained for some time a correspondence, and
Viktor Aim6 Huber, one of the prominent early theorists of
the Protestant social ethics movement.
Ketteler's
support
for
self-organized
worker
associations, producer cooperatives and what now would be
called employee stock-ownership programs, opening
opportunities for worker participation in managerial
decision making, etc., not only set the stage for further
developments in the social thought tradition's approach to
work-life issues. It also reflects an ongoing and overarching
concern with encouraging and sustaining mediating
institutions of all descriptions, including families, social
and political associations, economic self-help bodies, and
other forms of sodalities. Ketteler's interest in promoting a
wide-range
of
associational
activity,
enhancing
opportunities for authentic self-determination and a keen
appreciation of the impact of work on human character
have remained central themes of the social thought
tradition.
Despite the role of individuals like Ketteler, however,
the social thought tradition never has been chiefly a
clerically-driven or a narrowly sectarian undertaking.
From the start, it has been a collaborative project which
involved some of the leading figures interested in the social
question. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville actively was
engaged with Catholic social thought circles in Paris, while
Max Weber carried out extensive research on the status of
agricultural workers under the auspices of the Evangelical
(Lutheran) Social Congress during the early 1890's.
While religiously committed or influenced figures and
activists have played a leading role in developing the
concept of solidarity and its associated ideas, solidarity
itself is neither an expression of religious dogma nor a
reflection of sectarian belief. It is a porous notion, whose
insights draws from the experience of many and are
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available to all. Especially in the United States, however,
the Catholic social tradition has acted as the prime
transmitter of the notion and practices of solidarity. That
tradition traveled with and spoke first to the large body of
Catholic immigrants who came in repeated waves to the
United States during the nineteenth century from every
part of the European Continent. They used it as a
framework for the development of a thick web of social
institutions that established their place in a new world and
that assisted them in maintaining their identity in the face
of an often suspicious, not infrequently hostile, and
overwhelmingly Protestant American public.
The figure of Peter Dietz provides a good illustration of
the ties between the social thought tradition, the Catholic
immigrant community, and the American labor movement.
Born of impoverished German immigrant parents in New
York City in 1878, Dietz pursued part of his studies for the
priesthood in Germany, where he went to familiarize
himself with the work of Ketteler and his successors. After
his return to the United States, Dietz gained strong ties to
the labor movement and to its predominantly Irish Catholic
leadership. Over time, he came to enjoy a remarkable
influence in labor circles and with many in management as
well. His friend, Samuel Gompers, once informed Dietz that
he enjoyed "the unique distinction of having secured a
Board of the AFL
reversal of decisions by the Executive
10 2
[American Federation of Labor].'
Through his work with the AFL and numerous other
groups, Dietz played a major role in translating the first
social encyclical, Rerum novarum ("On the Condition of
Labor"), 103 into grass-roots action. He also was a precursor
for the remarkable line of "labor priests," who, like Dietz,
sought to bring the social teachings into reality through
their involvement in the labor movement. Their activities
took a wide variety of forms, including an ambitious
educational effort. For example, by the 1950's, there were
more than 100 "labor colleges" in the United States
conducted by these priests and their lay colleagues. Courses

102. Mark Karson, The Catholic Church and the Political Development of
American Trade Unionism (1900-1918), 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 527, 533
(1951).
103. See Papal social encyclical sources cited supra note 17.
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in the social teachings, as well as in organizing, bargaining,
labor law, economics, etc., were all part of the standard
curriculum in these institutions. Through the decades,
"labor priests" like Charles Rice (Pittsburgh), John
1 4 Clement Kern (Detroit), George
Corridan (New York),O
Higgins (Washington, D.C.), and Edward Boyle (Boston), to
name just a few, have played direct and significant roles in
the labor movement and in educating the public generally
about the Church's social tradition.
The influence of the social thought tradition has not
only occurred at a grass-roots level. It also made itself felt
in the New Deal legislation of which the National Labor
Relations Act was a part. For example, one commentator
Program of Social
"Bishops'
the
described
has
Reconstruction," promulgated in 1919 in the wake of the
end of the First World War as "an ambitious statement that
endorsed a minimum wage, subsidized housing, labor
participation in industrial management, child labor laws,
social insurance for the jobless, sick and old-aged, and other
New Deal program, thirteen years
reforms-basically, the
10 5
before the New Deal."
Priests active in social thought circles also played more
direct roles in effectuating policies intended to further
worker representation and civil rights within and without
the workplace. For instance, a well-known labor arbitrator
and social thought theorist, Fr. Francis J. Haas, among
many other responsibilities, served as one of the original
members of the State of Wisconsin's Labor Relations Board
and as a member of the first National Labor Relations
Board. Additionally, President Roosevelt appointed him in
1943 the Chair of the Fair Employment Practices
Commission and in 1947, President Truman named him to
the President's Committee on Civil Rights.
How much direct influence the social thought tradition
had on Senator Robert Wagner, the author of the National
Labor Relations Act, is not entirely known. Wagner did,
however, carry on an extensive correspondence with Fr.
Haas and with Fr. John A. Ryan, the architect of the 1919
104. The model for the Fr. Berry character in the movie,

ON THE

WATERFRONT (Columbia Pictures 1954).
105. GEORGE G. HIGGINS WITH WILLIAM BOLE, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE
CHURCH: REFLECTIONS OF A "LABOR PRIEST" 27 (1993).
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Bishop's statement and the foremost American social
thought theorist of his time, often referred to as the "Right
Reverend New Dealer." It is also said that the 1931 social
encyclical, "Quadragesimo anno," provided Wagner with an
intellectual framework for his legislative undertakings. We
cannot know to what degree that is true. Nevertheless,
among Wagner's personal papers relating to the NLRA are
two heavily annotated and underlined copies of the
encyclical.
Certainly, the NLRA is the product of numerous
sources, movements, experiences, and historical accidents.
Nevertheless, Fahlbeck is correct when he says that law is
"somehow un-American." In a real sense, that is true. It is
also true, as Fahlbeck says, that those "who want and need
10 6
concerted action" are "not like Americans at-large.'
Historically, a large proportion of them have not been, at
least not in their attitudes toward community and in the
way they understand the character of their ties and
obligations to others. To this subgroup of Americans,
solidarity is not an unfamiliar term. Instead, it describes
the foundations for a rightly-ordered world.
If I am correct about its influence, some of the attitudes
that have informed the NLRA might also explain something
about the difficulties the courts historically have had in
interpreting and applying the statute's terms. At least in
the case of the United States, I think the tension between
the courts and labor is less a class-based clash than it is a
head-on collision between the worlds of Thomas Hobbes and
Thomas Aquinas. It is little wonder that the attitudes of
labor often meet with so little comprehension in the minds
of the judges. In many instances, rulings that appear
regrettable or wholly inconsistent with the goals of the
NLRA are less the product of bad faith or willfulness than a
function of the encounter of incommensurable "faiths."
Until the courts recognize the profound differences of the
NLRA, they will continue to encounter enormous difficulties
in construing and applying its terms.

106. Fahlbeck, supranote 13, at 326.

924

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

VII. CONCLUSION

"To speak about solidarity," one German scholar
recently noted, "for some time has appeared to be old
but it once again has become a cutting-edge
fashioned,
topic. ' 107 As its central place in the draft European
Constitution exemplifies, and as the growing attention paid
to the topic by scholars in a variety of disciplines suggests,
the question of solidarity is anything but outmoded.
The significance of the nation-state is waning, while the
globalization of the economy has erased boundaries and
pushed all of us into increasingly closer contact with one
another. At the same time, mediating institutions and
sodalities of every sort are weakening. Even social
institutions like the family-which since ancient times
alike-fast are
and polities
grounded individuals
the numbers of
developed
world,
Across
the
disappearing.
people living alone, in single person "households," are at the
highest levels ever recorded, while marriage and birth rates
in the developed world are at the lowest levels ever seen,
even in times of war or famine. More people across the
world, especially including women, now participate in paid
or "market" work than at any time in history. In addition to
all this, the greatest migration of peoples the world has
ever experienced, from East to West and South to North, is
going forward. The social tradition and its understandings
of solidarity can serve as important resources for
addressing the challenges that these developments pose. In
our own "world altogether new," solidarity is not just labor's
question. It is more than ever our issue as well.

107. Franz Ruland, Solidaritdt, 48 NJW 3518 (2002).

